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VI 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
ARE PLAINTIFFS DAKAL AND DIVERSIFIED BONA 
FIDE PURCHASERS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY? 
ISSUE ONE: Is the Trial Court's ruling that Plaintiffs 
Dakal and Diversified had actual notice of American's prior 
adverse interest in the subject property supported by a quantum of 
evidence sufficient to withstand appellate review? 
ISSUE TWO: Similarly, did the evidence presented to the 
Trial Court support a finding that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy 
their duty of inquiry? 
ABBREVIATED FORMS 
To facilitate review and the treatment of the issues presen-
ted, the following terms will be used throughout this brief and 
accorded the meanings as follow: 
1. American—Defendant/Respondent American Savings & Loan 
Association. 
2. Dakal—Plaintiff/Appellant Dakal, Inc. 
3. Diversified—Plaintiff/Appellant Diversified Equities, 
Inc. 
4. F £—refers to the numbered paragraph of the Findings of 
Fact portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ren-
dered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. 
5. C £—refers to the numbered paragraph of the Conclusions 
of Law portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ren-
dered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. 
6. T £, L #—refers to the page and line of the trans-
cript of the hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick held 
on the 19th day of April, 1984. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal brought this action at law 
to quiet title to certain property located in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, in behalf of Diversified, subject to an equi-
table lien in favor of Dakal (Official Record, pp. 2-11). 
B. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT: 
This appeal arises from the judgment rendered by the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on the 23rd of July, 1984. Therein, 
the Court found that neither Diversified nor Dakal were bona fide 
purchasers of the subject property; refused to quiet title in 
Diversified? and, quieted title in Dakal subject to an equitable 
lien in favor of American equal to the amount of unpaid principal 
and arrearages due and owing (Official Record, pp. 286-291). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Respondent is in substantial agreement with facts as stated 
in Appellants1 Brief. To avoid needless duplication of effort, 
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Respondent declines to make a statement of facts (as allowed by 
Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proceduref effective 
Januaryf 1985). Where Respondent has found it necessary to sup-
plement or enlarge on the facts given in Appellants1 brief, it has 
done so in the text of its argument. Any supplemental facts are 
appropriately identified and indexed to their source (transcripts, 
findings, conclusions, or depositions). 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
I. It is unclear from the Appellants' brief submitted here-
in by counsel which of the Plaintiffs said counsel represents. 
Also, said brief is confusing and inconsistent as to which remedy 
each of the Appellants is seeking from this Court. 
II. Defendant/Respondent American Savings and Loan Associ-
ation contends that the burden of proof that a party was a bona 
fide purchaser of the subject property lies with the Appellant 
seeking to quiet title in the subject property. 
III. The issues raised by Appellants in their appeal are 
issues of fact which are subject to very limited review by this 
Court and any competent evidence which supports or infers support 
for the trial court's findings will uphold the findings of a trial 
court on questions of fact. 
A. Respondent submits that this action to quiet title 
is an action at law and therefore appellate review is limited 
to questions of fact. 
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B. If this Court determines that the instant case 
represents an action at equity, then the trial court's deci-
sion should be upheld unless the evidence clearly preponder-
ates against its findings. 
IV. In any event, the evidence presented at trial overwhel-
mingly supports the trial court's findings and conclusions that 
neither Diversified Equities, Inc. nor Dakal, Inc. are bona fide 
purchasers of the subject property because they had "actual 
notice" of Respondent's security interest in the subject proper-
ty. 
V. Also, because Appellants Diversified Equities, Inc. and 
Dakal, Inc. did not satisfy their duty of inquiry once they had 
actual notice of Respondent's interest in the property, Appellants 
are not bona fide purchasers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND THE REMEDIES SOUGHT 
THEREIN ARE CONFUSING AND UNCLEAR. 
Appellants' Brief, in several respects, is confusing and 
unclear as to which of the Appellants' positions it advocates. It 
is American's knowledge and belief that the law firm of Mooney & 
Smith represents both Diversified and Dakal. Yet, counsel alter-
natively lists itself as attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant and 
attorney for Plaintiff^s/Appellants* on the face sheet of its brief. 
Arguments presented by Appellants' brief are in behalf of 
only Dakal (see arguments listed in Appellants' Table of Contents 
p. ii). In addition, the relief sought on appeal, as it appears 
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in Appellants' Brief at page 1 and 2 cleatly asks for independent 
and inconsistent relief for both parties. 
Diversified prays that the judgment of the trial court be 
reversed and that its rights in the subject property be upheld. 
Although this is unclear, Respondent assumes that the rights which 
Diversified seeks to uphold are those prayed for in its Complaint. 
The prayer clause of the Complaint is stated as follows: 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows (a) 
quieting title in the name of Plaintiff Diversified 
Equities, Inc., subject only to the lien of Dakal, Inc. 
to the subject property; (Official Record, p. 4) 
Dakal, on the other hand, prays in Appellant's Brief, page 2, 
that the trial court's judgment be reversed and that Dakal be 
declared the owner of the subject property in fee simple, free and 
clear of any interest whatsoever in American Savings & Loan. The 
inconsistencies and alternate positions adopted by Appellants' 
Brief makes it difficult or impossible for American to know how to 
respond to the Brief. 
As noted above, Appellants' Brief, to the best of American's 
knowledge, seeks independent and inconsistent remedies. American 
contends that Appellants may not seek inconsistent remedies on the 
basis of a single combined brief. Common sense demands that a 
single brief can only logically support one position. This fact 
is illustrated by the unilateral nature of the arguments presented 
in the Brief (argument is in behalf of only Plaintiff Dakal). 
Although, Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
allows multiple appellants to join in a single brief, the Rule 
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^oes not allow inconsistent remedies to be sought in a single 
brief. Appellants' innovative procedural posture prejudices Amer-
ican. It is difficult, or at best burdensome, for American to 
respond to the Brief in its present form. 
Appellants' request for inconsistent remedies also creates a 
clear conflict of interest between Dakal and Diversified. The 
adverse interests of Dakal and Diversified make it extremely 
doubtful that they can be adequately represented by the same coun-
sel. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct states: 
(B) A Lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if 
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in 
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely 
affected by his representation of another client . . . . 
On the basis of Appellants' Brief, American believes that counsel 
may not represent both Dakal and Diversified in this matter. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF PROOF IN ESTABLISHING THEM-
SELVES AS BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified have emasculated the issue 
of burden of proof in their brief by citing Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 
1374 (Utah 1977). Ash v. State is cited in Appellant's Brief at 
p. 10 for the proposition that Plaintiffs, in a quite title 
action, have only the initial burden of going forward to prove a 
prima facie case. Once accomplished, the burden then shifts to 
the Defendant to overcome title shown in Plaintiff. Although the 
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proposition, as stated, is generally true, it is cited in a mis-
leading context. The specific issue in the present case is not 
the burden of proof in a quiet title action; rather, the issue is 
the burden of proof in establishing one's status as bona fide pur-
chaser. 
Plaintiffs' citation of Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 
1983), is also misleading. They cite the case, apparently, for 
the proposition that a prior unrecorded interest holder has the 
burden of proof in establishing that a subsequent purchaser had 
actual notice. This proposition is, again, correct in the proce-
dural context of Johnson v. Bell; the same is not true in the 
present action. In Johnson the prior unrecorded interest holder 
claimed that subsequent purchasers were not bona fide by bringing 
an action to quiet title. Therefore, the burden was correctly 
allocated to the Plaintiff to prove that subsequent purchasers 
were not bona fide purchasers. In the present action Dakal and 
Diversified have claimed that title should be quieted in them 
because they are bona fide purchasers. Therefore, it is incumbant 
on them to prove the necessary elements of that status. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in Nelson v. Hughes, 625 P.2d 643, 
645-650 (Or. 1981), thoroughly and authoritatively analyzed the 
burden of proof in the context of establishing the status of bona 
fide purchaser. The facts of the case are similar to those of the 
present case. Plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser, moved to quiet 
title in itself as against a prior unrecorded interest holder. 
After a lengthy treatment of the policies behind allocating proof 
and the precedents in Oregon, the Court concluded that the Plain-
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tiff should bear the burden of proof for establishing its status 
as a bona fide purchaser. In reaching this conclusion, the Oregon 
Court relied on several policy factors. In cases where a plain-
tiff/subsequent purchaser attempts to avail itself of the protec-
tions afforded to bona fide purchasers in a quiet title action, 
the following factors indicate that the plaintiff should bear the 
burden of proof. (1) The plaintiff is more likely able to produce 
such evidence; (2) The existence of the facts is essential to 
plaintiff's case; (3) The application of the statute is essential 
to the plaintiff's right of recovery; (4) The burden should be 
borne by plaintiff because the basic statutory policy of protect-
ing persons withih a statutory classification is furthered; and 
(5) The burden should be imposed upon the party who pleads the 
facts necessary to establish bona fide purchaser. Nelson at 645-
646. 
In Nelson, the Court considered whether the policy of the 
recording statute would be advanced by shifting the burden of 
proof. The Court held that the plaintiff in that case bore the 
burden of pleading and proving facts essential to being a bona 
fide purchaser. The Court based its opinion on reasoning 
reflected in an early New Jersey case. 
I confess that to my mind the language of the statute 
indicates no shifting of the burden of proof. The 
unrecorded instrument is not made invalid generally; it 
is made invalid only as to certain classes of per-
sons . . . . Logically, therefore, it would seem that 
one in order sucessfully to claim the benefit of the 
statutory provision must bear the burden of proving him-
self to be within the class of persons as to whom, only, 
the contract is declared invalid. McVoy v. Baumann, 93 
N.J. Eq. 360, 117A. 717, 723. Cited in Nelson at 647. 
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The Oregon statute cited is identical to the Utah statute. 
Although not controlling, the reasoning is applicable and persua-
sive. American's unrecorded interest is made invalid only to bona 
fide purchasers. Therefore, it is reasonable to require Dakal and 
Diversified to prove that they fall within the statutory classifi-
cation of bona fide purchaser. Therefore, consistant with the 
reasoning and result reached by the Oregon Supreme Court in 
Nelson, Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified should be required to not 
only plead, but also prove their status as bona fide purchasers. 
The record and the decision of the trial court clearly illustrate 
that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden. 
III. PLAINTIFFS1 ISSUES UPON APPEAL ARE QUES-
TIONS OF FACT AND AS SUCH, ARE SUBJECT 
TO VERY LIMITED APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Plaintiffs' first issue is whether Dakal and Diversified, as 
purchasers, received actual notice of American's prior interest in 
the subject property. The Utah Supreme Court, in a recent case, 
confirmed that the determination of whether a purchaser received 
actual notice of prior unrecorded interests is a question of fact. 
Johnson v. Bell, supra. In Johnson, Plaintiffs Verl and Mary 
Johnson were grantees under a Quit Claim Deed to 80 acres located 
in Tooele County. Prior to the time the Johnsons recorded their 
Quit Claim Deed the grantor, Milton Bell, executed a Trust Deed on 
the 80 acres to Murray First Thrift & Loan. The trial court found 
that Murray First Thrift, as trustee of the Trust Deed, did not 
have actual notice of the plaintiffs' interest in the property. 
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In upholding the decision of the trial court, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
Whether Murray First had actual notice was a question of 
fact which the Plaintiffs had the burden of proving. 
The trial court did not error in ruling that the plain-
tiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case that 
Murray First Thrift had actual notice as required by 
Section 57-1-6 [Utah Code Annotated], Johnson at 310. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Other jurisdictions within the Pacific Region are in accord with 
this position. Bailey v. Ewing, 671 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Idaho App. 
1983); Pflueger v. Hopple, 156 P.2d 316, 318 (Idaho 1945); Saxon 
v. Dubois, 209 Cal. App. 2d 713, 26 Cal. Rptr. 196, 200; Peterson 
v. First National Bank of Lander, 579 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Wyo. 
1978). (See 66 CJS Notice § 22, pp. 675-676.) 
Plaintiffs second issue, the determination of whether the 
duty of inquiry was satisfied, is also a question of fact. 
Although the Utah Court has apparently not ruled on this issue, 
the general trend of legal authority characterizes this issue as a 
question of fact. G. Thompson, 8 Thompson on Real Property, §4236 
at p. 451 (1963). Other jurisdictions within the Pacific Reporter 
Region have also ruled that this inquiry is a question of fact. 
U.S. Fiduciary Corp. v. Loma Vista Associates, 675 P.2d 724, 728 
(Ariz. App. 1983), (whether due inquiry was made is a question 
of fact); Berge v. Fredericks, 591 P.2d 246, 249 (Nev. 1979), (the 
question whether due inquiry was made is one of fact to be inves-
tigated by the jury). 
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A. THE PRESENT ACTION TO QOIET TITLE IN 
DAKAL AND DIVERSIFIED IS AN ACTION AT 
LAW; THEREFOREf APPELLATE REVIEW IS 
LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW. 
The scope of appellate review in Utah is influenced by two 
interrelated factors. The distinction between questions of law 
and questions of fact is decisive of the appropriate standard of 
review. This distinction produces different results depending 
whether it arises in an action at law or at equity. The law/ 
equity distinction has constitutional implications on the scope of 
appellate review. The scope of appellate review is addressed by 
the Utah Constitution in Article VIII, Section 9: 
From all final judgments of the district court, there 
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The 
appeal shall be upon the record made in the Court below 
and under such regulations as may be provided by law. 
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both 
law and fact; in cases at law, the appeal shall be on 
questions of law alone. (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted this constitutional provi-
sion in Christiansen v. Utah Transit Authority, 649 P.2d 42, 45 
1982). There, the court enunciated the precise scope of appellate 
review which would be accorded to cases at law. 
The Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9, 
limits our review in cases at law to questions of law 
and thus we will not disturb a jury verdict on a factual 
question which is supported by any competent evidence. 
Uinta Pipe Line Corporation v. Superior Co. , 546 P.2d 
885 (Utah 1976); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 
1975); Christiansen at 45. (Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court's review of questions of fact raised on appeal 
from actions at law, therefore, is limited to a determination of 
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whether any factual support exists in the record for the finding 
made by the trial court. 
A concrete example of the operation of this standard of 
review is found in Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Ut. 658, 238 P.2d 408 (Utah 
1951). In that case, Plaintiff brought an action to recover for 
false arrest and imprisonment. The trial court found for 
Plaintiff and Defendant appealed. In addressing the issue of 
whether the facts were sufficient to support the findings of the 
trial court, the Supreme Court stated: 
[The facts] are sufficient if the circumstances devel-
oped by the Plaintiff would support an inference that 
the Defendant was the directing or instigating force of 
the illegal arrest. Pixton at 408. 
Therefore, any competent evidence which supports or infers support 
for the trial court's findings is sufficient to uphold the find-
ings of a trial court on questions of fact. 
Having determined the appropriate standard of appellate 
review for questions of fact in actions at law, it remains only to 
determine whether the present action is indeed an action at law. 
Historically, an action to quiet title was considered to be 
equitable in nature. Utah courts have long since discarded this 
distinction based on historical origin. Utah case law during the 
last century has consistently held that a quiet title action is an 
action at law. 
The precise issue raised here, whether a quiet title action 
is an action at law for the purposes of determining the scope of 
appellate review, was decided by the Utah court in Dahnken v. 
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George Romney & Sons Co., 111 Ut. 471, 184 P.2d 211 (1947). In 
Dahnken, the Plaintiff brought an action td quiet title to a strip 
of land at the rear of his property. Defendants appealed from a 
judgment quieting title in Plaintiff, Th^ Court stated that the 
quiet title action was an action at law involving legal issues and 
therefore, "[0]ur review in law cases is limited to the 
determination of whether or not there is competent evidence to 
support the judgment of the trial court." Dahnken at 215. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has found quiet title actions 
to be actions at law in the context of determining a parties' 
right to a jury trial. Norback v. Board of Directors, Etc. 37 
P.2d 339, 343 (1934); Babcock v. Danqerfi^ld, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d 
862, 863 (1939); and Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 
250, 251 (1958). 
The precedents in Utah, as cited above, dictate that the pre-
sent quiet title action be considered an Action at law. The fact 
that the present action involves some eqijitable issues and reme-
dies does not, per se, convert the present action to an action at 
equity. In Norback, supra, the trial ccjmrt refused Plaintiff's 
demand for a jury trial because it believed the presence of equi-
table issues in the case converted it to an equity action. The 
Utah Supreme Court overruled the trial court stating: 
If the issues are legal or the major jissue legal, either 
party is entitled upon proper demand to a jury trial; 
but, if the issues are equitable or the major issues to 
be resolved by an application of equity, the legal issue 
being merely subsidiary, the action should be regarded 
as equitable and the rules of equity apply. Citations 
omitted. Norback at 345. (Citations ,omitted.) 
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imilarly, the major issues involved in the present action 
are legal in nature. This fact may be ascertained by the 
pleadings presented by both parties. Also, the fact that 
equitable relief was granted in the trial court memorandum 
decision does not disturb the status of this case as an action at 
law. In the Norback case, the Court opined: 
Where the issues are legal issues, the fact that equi-
table relief may be plead for, to carry into effect the 
judgments based upon the legal issues, "is not suffi-
cient to deprive either party of his right to have the 
legal issues submitted to a jury." Citation omitted. 
Norback at 343. 
The present action is by nature and by weight of precedent an 
action at law. The fact that some equitable issues or equitable 
remedies are involved does not change the basic nature of this 
case. The standard of appellate review for questions of fact in 
actions at law, as defined in Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution and judicial interpretations thereof, is to ascertain 
whether any evidence exists that supports or infers the result 
reached by the trial court. This is the appropriate standard of 
review for the issues of actual notice and adequacy of inquiry 
which Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified have raised on appeal. 
When the facts and evidence presented to the trial court are 
reviewed under this liberal standard, the decision below should be 
upheld. 
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B. IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT T&E PRESENT 
CASE IS ACTUALLY AN ACTION AT EQUITY, THEN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL BE UPHELD 
UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES 
AGAINST ITS FINDINGS. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court's statements concerninq the 
standard of review for findings of fact in equity cases have been 
somewhat varied, the standard most commonly given is that reversal 
is merited only when the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings of the trial court. Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 
478, 479 (Utah 1981); Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329, 330 (Utah 
1978); and, Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975). A 
good explanation of this standard of revi,ew is found in Nokes v. 
Continental Mining and Milling Company, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 
954. 
[T]he finding of the trial court will not be disturbed 
if the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding; 
nor, if the evidence thereon is evenly balanced or it is 
doubtful where the preponderance lie$; nor, even if its 
weight is slightly against the fidding of the trial 
court, but it will be overturned and another finding 
made only if the evidence clearly preponderates against 
his finding. Nokes at 954. 
The leniency of this standard of review has been explained, in 
part, in terms of the deference that an Apellate court gives to 
the trial court. The validity of determinations made by the trial 
court is supported by its opportunity to view the demeanor of 
witnesses and hear the testimony first har^ d. 
Again, because the issues presented on appeal are questions 
of fact (see discussion above), they receive very limited appel-
late review. In effect, the findings of the trial court that 
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Dakal and Diversified had actual notice, should only be reversed 
upon a determination by the Supreme Court that said findings are 
against the clear weight of the evidence. (See also Jensen v. 
Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981)). 
IV. EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY 
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS DIVERSIFIED AND DAKAL ARE NOT 
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. 
The protection provided to subsequent purchasers from prior 
unrecorded interests is codified at Utah law in Section 57-1-6, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953)f and also at Section 57-3-3, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). (Said statutes are set out in full text in the 
Addendum following the conclusion to Argument.) Section 57-3-3 
provides that prior unrecorded interests are defeated by subse-
quent purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration which 
are first recorded. Section 57-1-6 provides that prior unrecorded 
interests succeed against subsequent purchasers, first recording, 
who take with actual notice. American concurs with the point made 
in Appellants1 Brief at paqe 11 that the practical effect of the 
statutes is identical. The synthesis of these statutes, as 
applied to the present case, provides that American, whose inter-
est was not of record at the time of the sale to Dakal and Diver-
sified, will prevail unless Dakal and Diversified paid a valuable 
consideration and took the property without actual notice of 
American1s interest. 
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The term "actual notice," as it is used in the Utah statute, 
is a term of art which includes the concept of constructive 
notice. A plethora of case law and legal authority supports this 
proposition. In 1923 the Supreme Court in the case of Lawley v. 
Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 Pac. 526 (1922) cited with approval 
the following provision of 39 Cyc. 1703: 
Notice to effect purchasers for value with charges on 
property purchased may be actual or constructive. There 
is conflict in the cases and among writers as to what is 
actual notice, but as actual and constructive notice are 
the same in effect, it is immaterial which kind of 
notice is received by the purchaser. Lawley at 530. 
The general standard for determining when a party has 
received actual notice is reiterated in Johnson v. Bell, supra. 
[T]he "actual notice" required by S^ection 57-1-6 was 
satisfied if a party dealing with th£ land had informa-
tion of facts which would put a prudent man upon inquiry 
and which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as 
to the state of the title. Johnson at 310. 
Not only is a party put on notice by information or facts suspi-
cious in nature, but a party is charged with knowledge of all 
facts and information that would have been! discovered upon a dili-
gent inquiry. 
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put 
the party on his guard and call for ijnquiry is notice of 
everything to which such inquiry might have lead. When 
a person has sufficient information to lead him to a 
fact he shall be deemed conversant of it. McGarry v. 
Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288,| 293 (194FT 
When these standards are applied to the facts of the present 
case, it is readily apparent that Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified 
had actual knowledge of American's prior unrecorded interest. 
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In light of the suspicious facts and circumstances that con-
fronted Dakal and Diversified in the purchase of this property, 
Plaintiffs were put on notice not only that American had an inter-
est, but that its release of said interest was a mistake. The 
facts which Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified had in their posses-
sion prior to the time of sale are found at pages 19 to 23 of this 
brief. That compilation provides compelling evidentiary support 
for the finding of the trial court that Diversified and Dakal 
indeed had actual knowledge of American's interest. 
Because of the complicated facts of this case as well as the 
large number of parties involved, it is helpful at this point to 
define the relationships of the parties and the consequences of 
those relationships on the issue of actual notice. Plaintiffs 
Dakal and Diversified are separate entities. However, Wayne Peck 
is the principal of both entities (F. 23). All knowledge posses-
sed by Wayne Peck, therefore, would also be attributable to both 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified. 
Brad Pentelute, a mortgage broker, acted as the agent of 
Dakal and Wayne Peck throughout the transaction of the sale of 
subject property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff 
Dakal (F.23). Any knowledge or information that Mr. Pentelute 
acquired during the course of the transaction may also be imputed 
to Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified. This imputed knowledge or 
notice is based upon the proposition that knowledge gained by an 
agent while acting in the scope of his agency is imputed to the 
principal. This principle was recognized by the Utah Supreme 
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Court in FMA Financial Corporation v. Hanson Dairy Inc.y 617 P.2d 
327, 329-330 (Utah 1980). There, the lessor entrusted the hand-
ling of its interest in a transaction to an agent. In subsequent 
litigation with the lessee, the lessor was held responsible for 
any knowledge possessed by the agent. Therefore, it is clear that 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified are charged with the knowledge 
possessed by Mr. Peck or Mr. Pentelute concerning the sale of the 
subject property. 
Defendant American submits the following set of facts and 
circumstances, drawn from the official record of proceedings 
before the trial court, to illustrate that Plaintiffs Dakal and 
Diversified indeed had actual knowledge of American's interest in 
the subject property. Even though American contends that the 
facts, as compiled here, present compelling evidence of the actual 
knowledge of Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, it is important to 
remember that the findings of the court need only find minimal 
support in the facts. (See Argument III). 
If the present action is deemed an action at law, then the 
decision of the trial court should be upheld upon a finding of any 
competent evidence in support thereof. \.f deemed an action at 
equity, then the trial court's decision should be upheld upon a 
finding that the evidence does not clearly preponderate against 
it. 
1. Mr. Rydalch had actual knowledge of American's 
prior interest when he bought the subject property 
in May of 1982: 
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(a) Rydalch's warranty deed clearly stated an 
indebtedness only to American and no other 
lender (F. 7). 
(b) When Rydalch purchased the subject property, 
he signed an Indemnification and Waiver 
Agreement relating American (F. 9). 
(c) Buyers Escrow instructions expressly stated 
that the property was subject to American's 
Trust Deed and Non-Assumption Agreement 
(P. 8). 
(d) The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. 
carefully explained that the property was sub-
ject to American's Deed of Trust (F. 12). 
(e) The title insurance policy prepared by Stewart 
Title at the closing of the sale to Rydalch 
clearly noted American's interest (and did not 
show any interest of Beehive Thrift and Loan 
Co.) (Defendant's Ex. 40 and F. 11). 
2. Plaintiffs had actual knowledge that Rydalch had 
purchased the property subject to the American 
encumbrance, 
(a) Rydalch delivered the Stewart Title Insurance 
policy he had received at closing to Mr. 
Pentelute (F. 27). 
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laintiff Dakal and Diversified had actual knowl-
edge that Rydalch had not paid the outstanding debt 
to American: 
(a) Mr. Pentelute and Mr. Peck had sufficient 
knowledge to put them on inquiry or construc-
tive notice of American's interest (F. 24). 
(b) Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified are held to 
the knowledge that neither Rydalch nor anyone 
else had paid American, a fact which clearly 
would have been discovered on adequate inquiry 
(F. 25). 
Pentelute and Peck had knowlege that something was 
wrong with Rydalch1s representation of unencumbered 
fee simple ownership: 
(a) Pentelute and Peck were experts or had sub-
stantial experience in dealings with dis-
tressed properties and real estate trans-
actions in general (F. 27). 
(b) Pentelute and Peck knew that Rydalch had pur-
chased subject to American's interest in May 
of 1982 (F. 27). 
(c) Rydalch was willing to sell the property in 
November or December of '82 for less than half 
its market value (F. 26). 
(d) Rydalch, his attorney Burnett, and Pentelute 
made repeated calls to American concerning the 
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status of the account (T. 14, L. 1-8); (T. 18, 
L. 15-20). 
Additional facts illustrate that Plaintiffs Dakal 
and Diversified had actual notice of American's 
interest at the time of sale: 
(a) Plaintiff Dakal paid all of the closing costs 
for the sale (F. 30) . 
(b) Wayne Peck paid a finders fee of $14,000 to 
Mr. Pentelute on the subject property which 
was purchased for a sales price of $37,980 (F. 
26). 
(c) Plaintiff Dakal sold the property to Plaintiff 
Diversified on the same day the transaction 
was closed with Rydalch. Plaintiff Diversi-
fied paid $37,980 for the property and sold it 
on the same day for $60,000. 
The property was purchased for a price grossly dis-
proportionate to the market value thereof: 
(a) Plaintiff Diversified purchased the pro-
perty for $37,980 (F. 26). 
(b) Rydalch estimated the property to be 
worth $76,000 (T. 12, L. 2). 
(c) Wayne Peck estimated the property to be 
worth $70,000 to $75,000 (T. 19, L. 3). 
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(d) An appraisal done by Academy Appraisal 
Associates in 1982 valued the property at 
$103,000 as did the title insurance poli-
cy issued by Stewart Title (F. 11 and 
Defendant's Exhibit 40}. 
Notice may be imputed from the mere fact that the sales price 
was grossly disproportionate to the market value of the property. 
It is well established in Utah law that a grossly disproportionate 
sales price, of itself, may be enough to put a purchaser on notice 
of a prior unrecorded interest. In Lawley v. Hickenlooper, supra, 
the Supreme Court cited with approval Section 39 Cyc 1718; 
Where the contract under which the , purchaser buys is 
sufficient on its face to put him on [inquiry as to what 
consideration was or where it plainly shows consider-
ation has not been paid or performed, he is chargeable 
with notice thereof. A nominal or a grossly inadequate 
consideration recited in a deed is a sufficient circum-
stance, for a reasonable time after such deed is made 
and recorded, to put a purchaser or inquiry. Lawley at 
530. (Emphasis added.) 
The position adopted by the Utah court in Lawley is consis-
tent with the position of the Restatement of the Law on Restitu-
tion. 
The transfer is for value although the consideration is 
of less value than the property transferred. The dif-
ference in value, however, may be evidence that the 
transferee had notice that the transferor held the pro-
perty subject to an equity in the favor of another. 
Restatement of Restitution, Section 173, Comment b. 
The foregoing evidence and facts submitted to the trial court 
provide clear, persuasive and compelling support for the trial 
court's finding that Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal did have 
actual notice of American's interest. The evidence, when viewed 
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as a whole, is unequivocally sufficient notice to "excite atten-
tion," and "put a prudent man upon inquiry." 
As has been noted, evidence is considered sufficient to sup-
port a trial court's findings if it depicts circumstances suffi-
cient to infer those findings. (See Pixton v. Dunn, supra.) Rea-
sonable inferences drawn from the facts listed above clearly sup-
port the trial court's decision. Therefore Dakal and Diversified 
cannot be accorded the status of bona fide purchasers. 
Common sense and the Plaintiff's knowledge of the real estate 
market would undoubtedly have alerted Plaintiffs Dakal and 
Diversified to the irregularities regarding the subject property. 
They knew that Rydalch had purchased the property subject to 
almost $60,000 worth of indebtedness. They knew that no one else 
would have paid American. They knew that Rydalch, had he paid the 
$60,000 indebtedness, would not be willing to sell the property 
for $37,980. They knew that Rydalch could not have paid $60,000 
to American when he was unable to pay $20,000 to Holzer (Official 
Record, p. 23). They knew tha - a $60,000 encumbrance would not 
disappear, in the space of six months, into thin air. The repea-
ted phone calls and conversations concerning American's release of 
its Trust Deed evidence that Plaintiffs were highly suspicious 
about that transaction. When the evidence is viewed as a whole 
with the inferences that must logically be drawn therefrom, it is 
clear that Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal had actual notice of 
American's interest and the mistake which had inadvertently been 
made. 
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V, PLAINTIFFS DIVERSIFIED AND DAKAL DID NOT 
SATISFY THEIR DOTY OF INQUIRY AND THEREFORE 
CANNOT BE ACCORDED THE STATUS OF BONA FIDE 
PURCHASERS. 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified are charged with knowledge 
of everything they could have discovered upon a diligent inquiry. 
(See McGarry, supra.) Plaintiffs contend that, being on actual n-
otice, they satisfied their duty of diligent inquiry. In effect, 
Plaintiffs argue that diligent inquiry would not have disclosed 
American's outstanding interest. This proposition can be analyzed 
both factually and legally. Plaintiffs' diligence in pursuing an 
inquiry will be analyzed by examining what the Plaintiffs 
factually did and did not do. Legal analysis of the diligence of 
Plaintiffs' inquiry will be made by comparing Plaintiffs actions 
with the standard of diligence required by law. 
First, what did Plaintiffs do? Plaintiffs or their agent 
Pentelute asked Rydalch if the loan had been paid. His response 
was that he had called American or his attorney Burnett had called 
American and they had represented on repeated occasions that the 
loan had been paid off. Pentelute, Plaintiffs' agent, also made 
one phone call to American concerning the status of the loan. He 
was informed, at that time, that the loan had been paid off. 
Plaintiffs' also procured a title policy on the subject property 
from Stewart Title Company which did not list the American encum-
brance. In summary, Plaintiffs relied on a series of four phone 
calls made to American. They relied on those representations even 
though they could not remember with whom they had spoken. (Rydalch 
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deposition, p. 61, L. 14). They also relied on the record title 
reflected in the Stewart Title Insurance Policy. 
What things did the Plaintiffs fail to do? Plaintiffs clear-
ly avoided several inquiries which could have easily been made, 
and which under the circumstances, should have been made. In the 
lengthy record before the trial court, Plaintiffs never alleged 
that they attempted to ascertain who had paid American. They 
relied on the representations that the account was paid; even 
though, they had actual knowledge that Rydalch had not paid it. 
The true identity of the "phantom payor" could have easily been 
ascertained had Plaintiffs attempted to do so. In light of the 
circumstances and the Plaintiffs knowledge that things were amiss, 
these inquiries should have been made. 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified not only failed to make 
inquiry, but they failed to give any explanation why inquiry was 
not made. American hereby submits that Plaintiffs did not want to 
know who had paid the outstanding loan amount; they did not want 
to know because they realized that, in fact, no one had paid the 
loan. They knew or should have known that American had made a 
mistake. They failed to use due diligence in their inquiry 
because they intended to and did take advantage of that mistake. 
A telling analogy can be drawn between the conduct of Plain-
tiffs Dakal and Diversified and the conduct of a bank customer who 
receives an over credit on his checking account. Upon receiving a 
monthly bank statement, the bank customer notes that his checking 
account has been over credited by the amount of $10,000. The cus-
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tomer is positive that he has not deposited that amount. During 
the next few days the customer calls tne bank concerning his 
checking account. However, instead of notifying the bank that an 
error has been made, the customer merely inquiries as to his 
account balance. The account balance, He is told, is $10,000. 
Over the next couple of weeks the customed calls the bank several 
more times assuming that the error would be detected. The 
balance, however, remains at $10,000. During none of these 
inquiries, has the customer inquired as to who might have 
deposited the amount in his account. At this point, the customer 
decides he has waited long enough. He goes to the bank, he 
withdraws the money; and, he spends it. A month passes and the 
bank, inevitably, discovers the error. JThe bank customer then 
claims that not only was he not aware of the mistake, but he had 
made adequate inquiry of the bank. 
Just as that bank customer would not be allowed to retain the 
benefits of the bank's error of whichl he was fully aware, 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified should npt be allowed to retain 
the benefits of the mistake which tqey knew American had 
committed. As the Supreme Court stated in the case of Pender v. 
Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1950), " [T]he [recording] 
statute was not enacted to protect one whose ignorance of the 
title is deliberate and intentional." |ln view of the highly 
suspicious facts Plaintiffs possessed, their reliance on the 
representations of unnamed individuals and the title policy was 
absolutely unreasonable and in bad f^ith. A quote from 
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ADH^Iants' Brief is very appropriate in explaining that those who 
are not honest in real estate transactions cannot claim to be bona 
fide purchasers, 
(4) "Good faith ordinarily exists where the purchase is 
made with an honest purpose; good faith is absent where 
ignorance of outstanding interests is deliberate and 
intentionalf and it has been held that a want of caution 
and deligence which an honest man of ordinary prudence 
is accustomed to exercise ITT making purchases is, in 
contemplation of law, a want of good faith." 77 Am, 
Jur. 2d, Vendor & Purchaser, § 646, p. 761. (Appel-
lants' Brief at p. 11.) 
The legal standard concerning the adequacy of a purchaser's 
inquiry cannot be distilled into a rigidite principle. The vari-
ety of facts and circumstances that attend real estate transac-
tions require that the legal standard be quite flexible. There-
fore, a purchaser's inquiry would be adequate if it is prosecuted 
with due diligence which is reasonable under the circumstances. 
Where one has notice of a fact affecting property which 
he seeks to purchase which puts him upon inquiry, he is 
chargeable with knowledge which the inquiry, if made, 
would have revealed; and one is put upon inquiry by 
notice of a claim which is inconsistent with the title 
he seeks to obtain, and must exercise due diligence to 
ascertain the facts upon which the claim is based. 
U.S. Fiduciary Corp., 675 P.2d 724 (Ariz. App. 1983). 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified make much of the fact that 
they purchased in reliance on the record title. Plaintiffs argue 
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that the trial court's decision establishes a dangerous precedent 
in that purchasers would no longer be able to rely on record 
title. This argument is specious. Upholding the decision of the 
trial court in this case, in fact, establishes no new precedent at 
all. The unmistakable message of such a ruling would be that 
purchasers may not blindly rely on record title when they have 
actual notice of circumstances or facts which would require them 
to make further inquiry. That proposition was established by the 
Supreme Court in 1950 in the case of Pender v. Bird, supra. 
The facts in Pender are very similar to those of the present 
case. There, the Plaintiff purchased a piece of property after 
being advised of several suspicious circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. Even though the record title demonstrated that the 
grantor was the owner of the property, the purchaser took with 
notice that ownership was disputed. Much like the present case, 
the consideration paid for the purchase was grossly disporportion-
ate to the value of the property. Plaintiff then brought an 
action to quiet title to the property as against Defendants who 
claimed a prior unrecorded interest therein. The Court flatly 
rejected plaintiffs reliance on record title stating: 
Plaintiff's claim that he relied on abstracts of title 
in the office of the County Recorder, avails him nothing 
in view of the fact that he was put on notice by his 
grantor that the latter then had no title. . . . Un-
questionably the Defendant knew that he was purchasing a 
suspicious and speculative title for a sum hardly more 
than sufficient to defray the cost of executing the 
deed. Pender at 1059-1060. 
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in light of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the sale 
from Rydalch, Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified should not be able 
to assert the protection of record title. In U.S. Fiduciary 
Corporation v. Loma Vista Associates, supra, the Plaintiff asser-
ted his reliance on record title and diligent inquiry. Plaintiff 
argued that his duty of inquiry was satisfied by the following 
actions: He examined all the documents in the chain of title; 
visited two county offices to learn about zoning restrictions and 
sewer connections; visited a title company to discuss the nature 
and legal ramifications of the contract for sale of real estate; 
and, he obtained a map which depicted the land which fell within 
the three parcels. The Court, however, found that the Plaintiff 
was not a bona fide purchaser because he failed to ascertain who 
the real owner of the property was when that issue was clearly in 
doubt. Plaintiff was not allowed to assert record title in the 
face of his failure to take, what the court described as the 
"simplist approach". Similarly, Plaintiffs1 reliance on record 
title is patently unreasonable because they failed to make an ade-
quate inquiry. The fact that Plaintiffs called to inquire about 
the account does not justify blind reliance on a representation 
that they knew was erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, after hearing the testimony of the witnes-
ses, and weighing the evidence, concluded that Plaintiffs had 
actual notice of American's interest. It is also implicit that 
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Plaintiffs, in fact, refused to make an inquiry which would have 
avoided the entire problem. 
The issues Plaintiffs present on appeal are questions or tact 
and as such should receive minimal review. American believe r.nat 
when the appropriate standard of review - any c< .**: ••-- •- - •-.-i-- ,-- -
is applied to the facts of this case, "Plaintiffs appeal must be 
dismissed• ' -;e decision of the tria 1 cour t s h o u 1 d receive -ne 
g r e a t e s t d e * -^' -j - :: f 11 I e f a c t s o i I w h i • 21: 1 i t lib a s 
judgment. 1 
American does n.-.* -\ -< * - > v^<-1- o discard • -^  - - „; estate 
rec- . .. •••••• 11 - * .J 1 
any extraordinary precedent, What it does ask is that - m ? "o.;rt 
protect 1 ••• c***- parties, ever •• * «v ;o make mistakes, from the 
si: ? * , wl 10 attempt to take 
unfa:- advantage. Thus, Respondent requests this Honorable Court 
to affirm the trial court's Judgment and order already entered 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of January, 1985. 
H. Mifflin'Williams III 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
OCA 57-1-6: RECORDING NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE - OPERATION AND 
EFFECT - INTEREST OF PERSON NOT NAMED IN INSTRUMENT -
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of wri-
ting setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate or 
whereby any real estate may be effected, to operate as notice to 
third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the 
manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without 
such proofs, acknowledgement, certification or record, and as to 
all other persons who have had actual notice. Neither the fact 
that an instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a 
nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such 
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance other-
wise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or 
stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge any third 
person with a notice of interest of any person or persons not 
named in such instrument or the grantor or grantors; but the gran-
tee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was conveyed to 
him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed 
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided 
setting forth the names of the beneificiaries, specifying the 
interest claimed in describing the property charged with such 
interest. 
OCA 57-3-3: EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD -
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall 
not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as 
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, 
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. 
ARTICLE VIII - SECTION 9, UTAH CONSTITUTION -
SECTION 9 [APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURT - FROM JUSTICE 
COURTS] 
From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall 
be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be 
upon the record made in the Court below and under such regulations 
as need be provided by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on 
questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall 
be on questions of law alone. Appeals shall also lie from the 
final order and decrees of the court in the administration of 
decedents estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall be pro-
vided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of 
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the district 
courts on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations 
and restrictions as shall be provided by law; and the decisions of 
the district court on such appeal shall be final, except in cases 
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute. 
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